## 1NC

### 1NC - Kritik

#### The exclusion of Blackness from the Symbolic Order provides the pre-requisite ontological plane upon which the fabric of civil society situates ontic manifestations of anti-queerness. However, the philosophical fields of Afro-pessimism and Queer Theory fail to conceptualize the “black queer” without performative contradiction. We use “Onticide” to coherently frame Surplus Violence: the meeting of anti-blackness and anti-queerness manifested through egregious acts of overkill targeted towards Quare Bodies. Thus, we conclude that the “black queer” exists outside of meaning and humanist grammar.

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[“Onticide, Afropessimism, Queer Theory, & Ethics,” https://illwilleditions.noblogs.org/files/2015/09/Warren-Onticide-Afropessimism-Queer-Theory-and-Ethics-READ.pdf] MYLES \*When the evidence mentions slurs, the intention is to not spread hate-speech, but rather to use the semantics involved in Steen Fenrich’s murder to highlight a philosophical double-turn between Queer Theory and Afro-pessimism.

* Why is the “black queer” a conceptual problematic? Afro-pessimism pushes Quare bodies to the periphery through its framing of Blackness as fungible commodity, which erases manifestations of Surplus Violence. Queer Theory glosses over racialized violence in its attempts to assign the “black queer” as suffering from heteropatriarchy in the same way as homonormative (white gay) subjects.

What I have argued throughout this essay is that the “black queer” is a conceptual problematic that is not fully understood in any of the theoretical discourses intended to explicate it. Neither “Queer theory” nor “Afro-pessimism” can articulate the fatal collision that pushes a being outside the symbolics of temporality, space, and meaning. Queer theory’s “closeted humanism” reconstitutes the “human” even as it attempts to challenge and, at times, erase it. The violence of captivity provides the condition of possibility for queer theory. Queerness must disavow this violence to assume the posture of “emancipatory meditation,” in some cases, and “radical divesture” in other cases. The social does not exist without the mutilated body of the captive—reduced to a “thing,” a being for the captive. Queer theory has yet to acknowledge or engage this history of violence at its core—every radical proclamation whether “anti” humanist or avowedly humanist is imbricated and complicit in this violence. Afro-pessimism, conversely, explicates the violence of captivity and rightly understands it as constitutive of the world itself. It, however, is caught in the “double-bind of communicability” that repeats the very violence of undifferentiation that it critiques. This double-bind is not the “creation” of the Afro-pessimist, but is, instead, an unavoidable violence that exposes some black-objects to forms of anti-blackness not properly theorized (e.g. if we think of “anti-gay” violence as a particular form, or iteration, of anti-blackness itself). Because undifferentiation assumes a homogenous object pulverized by a monolithic violence, it often conceals the insidious ways that anti-blackness cuts the object differently. Some violence is directed to specific “object-forms,” and although we can not properly call this specificity “identity,” “sexuality,” “gender,” or “orientation” because these are human attributes, we need a way of describing the violence directed toward the “inconceivable being-ness” of the black queer. The lack of a proper grammar outside of humanism to name both the target of this violence and the violence itself is a theoretical problem that redoubles itself in physical forms of destruction. I have given a name to this physical and theoretical violence—“onticide.” It is the meeting of the non-ontology of blackness, sustained through the viciousness of anti-blackness, and the extreme condition of suffering, sustained through compulsory performances, practices, and pleasures (anti-gay violence). The “Black Queer,” then, is a problem for thought, to borrow Nahum Chandler’s phrase, and to suggest that it does not “exist” is to indicate that it is outside of meaning and humanism’s grammar. [23] To assert its existence would amount to a conceptual contradiction because “Blackness” is the ontological position of the derelict object, unredeemable, and “Queerness” is the site of a subjectivity pushed to its limit—pushed, but yet within the scope of humanity. The two positions are not reconcilable, and when they do intersect, the result is fatal. The suffering of anti-gay violence is within the world; we have a grammar to capture its horror. The “suffering” of the black-object is not of this world—it sustains the world, but is not of it—and the “suffering” of this object lacks a proper grammar (the word “suffering” itself must be written in quotation marks or under erasure in relation to the black-as-object). The ‘being’ situated at the site of this violence is what we call a “black queer,” but it is a ‘being’ that does not exist within the onto-existential horizon, and if we insist on the “existence” of this being it inhabits such a low frequency that its existence becomes inconsequential. Indeed, bodies are visible and perceptible to the ‘eye,’ but every seeing, every phenomenal entity must first have a place within the Symbolic before it is comprehensible. Bodies without flesh, without the narratives of life, movement, and futurity that the flesh presents to the world, cannot be said really to exist at all—they are specters of ontology, socially dead bodies, stripped of flesh and existence. This social death is what Jared Sexton and Huey Copeland would call “raw life.” It is a life indistinguishable from death, existence reduced to “meat”—which is really no human existence at all. [24] What you “see” when you look at a “black queer” is the incomprehensible, the outer-worldly. To put things differently, my conception of existence here is the activation of ‘flesh,’ which is different from the body— bodies do not exist without the flesh, and it is the “flesh” that was stolen from the captive, and it is the flesh that is irretrievable, despite “optimistic” desires to reclaim it. [25] The “black queer” and the violence that engenders it present methodological problems that are unresolvable. Because of these problems, I have had to write within the tension of impossible communicability; this necessitates using paradox, oxymoron, and contradiction to describe the indescribable and to name the innominate. This is inescapable. One must articulate the underbelly of humanism through humanism—the discursive terrain is uneven and “unjust.” If there is indeed “no outside” to the “master” text of humanism, the methodological problem is a violence that forecloses the articulation of blackness from the start. Blackness is a textual “slave” lacking recognition or resistance. The “black queer” is entrapped in this methodological quagmire. This is the dreaded condition of the “black queer,” and it is a condition that we must continue to theorize around, even if we can never actually approach it.

#### The concept of black ungendered flesh exposes the inability of the 1AC to account for sexual differentiation as it applies to blackness – it also proves that the rubric of ‘patriarchy’ is insufficient and necessarily parasitic on approaching a broader conceptualization of gender

Douglass 18. Patrice D. Douglass, Assistant Professor of Gender, Sexuality & Feminist Studies at Duke University, PhD from the University of California Irvine, “Black Feminist Theory for the Dead and Dying,” *Theory & Event*, Volume 21, Number 1, January 2018, pg. 116-119, ar

Is Gender for the Captive?

There is a question announcing itself through the halls and silos of the academy, “does Afro-pessimism adequately deal with the question of black gender?” More aptly, the concern appears to wonder, what can Afro-pessimism say about structure of Black gendered suffering? Is it theoretical silent on this point, when in all other iterations it is theoretically quite loud? Afro-pessimism,40 as a theory, arose in conversation between Saidiya Hartman and Frank B. Wilderson, III as they worked to carve out a space for Black theorizing, which Hartman terms the position of the unthought.41 Drawing on theory and language of Black feminist theorists like Hartman and Hortense J. Spillers, Wilderson later describes Afro-pessimists as, “theorists of Black positionality who share Fanon’s insistence that, though Blacks are indeed sentient beings, the structure of the entire world’s semantic field – regardless of culture or national discrepancies – ‘leaving’ as Fanon would say ‘existence by the wayside’ – is sutured by anti-Black solidarity.”42 Wilderson cautioned against upholding Afro-pessimism as a school of thought. In fact, there are many scholars and activist engaging Afro-pessimism worldwide that carry out the possibilities of its explanatory potentials. Jared Sexton has further described that,

Afro-Pessimism is both an epistemological and an ethical project, and these two tributaries of thought converge in the carefully navigated stream of consciousness whose abstraction enables a theorem of political ontology deduced or derived from the cutting edge of black studies: that infinitely narrowing margin of practical-theoretical activity that provides us with weapons.43

Afro-pessimism for the intent of this argument here, provides the weapons for an unwavering analysis of Blackness that “raises the question of whether gender… [is] at all applicable to the condition of the captive community.”44

Insofar as there is a mappable concern about gender and Afropessimism, a primary issue lies with how the theory is thought to employ the concept of “ungendering” as presented by Spillers. Afropessimism is visibly indebted to the work of Spillers as represented through its conceptual maneuvers, language, and citational practices. Spillers argues,

Under these conditions, we lose at least gender difference in the outcome, and the female body and the male body become a territory of cultural and political maneuver, not at all gender-related, gender-specific. But this body, at least from the point of view of the captive community, focuses a private and particular space, at which point of convergence biological, sexual, social, cultural, linguistic, ritualistic, and psychological fortunes join.45

This scene illustrating the hold on bodies made into flesh. The question becomes, what does Afro-pessimism have to say about the “she” of this condition? The “she,” which Spillers contends, is “female flesh ‘ungendered’” and “offers a praxis and a theory, a text for living and dying, a method for reading both through their diverse mediations.”46 The assumption is that Afro-pessimism theorizes the “she” into a space of unmattering, a void lacking significance. Considering what Spillers argues above, such would seem to belie the intent of theorizing “ungendering” as a structural component of captivity. However, I would suggest there is a conceptual misstep that buttresses concerns about Afro-pessimism and gender. Afro-pessimism theorizes at the level of structure. It is concerned with how bodies are positioned in the world. While performance is important to the imperative concerns of studies of race and gender, Afro-pessimism does not stake an investment in mediating Blackness “as a variously and unconsciously interpellated identity or as a conscious social actor.”47 In other words, the structural components of captivity for Afro-pessimism machinate with or without the consent and/or actions of captives. Afro-pessimism also is centrally concerned with theorizing anti-black violence as that which lacks the discursive capacity to be named. Thus, it would seem quite impossible to definitively assert that the violence Afro-pessimism theorizes is in fact not gender violence ungendered Black. Such cannot be said.

I would like to bring attention to the words italicized by Spillers in the breakout quote above. Together it reads, Gender in the outcome. However, let us rephrase this into question. What is gender in the outcome of theory? Answers evade a direct response to this question. If we parse out gender, outcome, and theory each term has the potential for multiple inferences. Gender, for the gendered and ungendered inflect upon the separation of worlds. As Spillers argues, “the gendered female exists for the male, we might say that the ungendered female – in an amazing stroke of pansexual potential – might be invaded/raided by another woman or man.”48 Existence for the gendered female is a degraded status constituted by patriarchy. The invasion/raiding of the ungendered female exposes the logic of patriarchy as conceptually inept at balancing the weight of being possessed by all genders and the term gender itself. Outcome, in this respect lacks finality, demonstrating the repetition of an antagonistic interplay of worlds. Although discourses like that produced in support of the Women’s March, would suggest the outcomes of these worlds are mended, lending its nuances to political coalitions, such is a farce. Theory then has the potential to provide a lens to think through and across the division of degraded existence and the status of complete dispossession. Just as it is within reason to ask Afro-pessimism to locate gender, the reverse, I argue, demands greater theoretical concern. Do the concerns of gender, adequately account for the structural concerns of Afro-pessimism? Does Afro-pessimism deracinate gender or is Black gender obliterated prior to theory by the violence Afro-pessimism takes on as the orbit of its concerns?

In order to approach these questions, we must contend with the death of Korryn. Empathy could not find her. She made videos and wrote statements that spoke against the power of the police. She told her five-year-old son the cops were trying to kill him. Where was her concern for his innocence? She illegally covered her license plate. She drove around town looking for an altercation with the police. She talked back. She filmed her body being violated. She fought back. She did not appear in court. She refused to open her door to allow Baltimore SWAT to serve her a bench warrant. She had a gun. She stood her ground. She was called paranoid. She was determined by public opinion to be mentally ill. She was made to bear the burden of proof that she did not deserve to die this way. Where is the support of her persistence?49 Where is the narrative for Korryn asserting that no behavior constitutes a justification for gender violence? Where is the march for her?

Black feminism and Afro-pessimism converge for Korryn. Each is pessimistic about the explanatory power of gender to confront the entrails of Black gender that are “not at all gender-related gender-specific.” 50 Each offering an unflinching analysis of the world that rendered her vulnerability absolute, the world she resisted, and the world that misunderstood and failed her.51 The afterlife of slavery breeds the necessity to remember Black women, like Korryn, so she is not held as collateral damage of an articulation of gender that theorizes her into a void. Black women are subjected to brutal physical, sexual, discursive, systemic, and structural violence. Korryn, and all those gendered Black, are “bound by the fetters of sentiment, held captive by the vestiges of the past, and cast into a legal condition of subjection – these features limn the circumstances of an anomalous, misbegotten, and burdened subject no longer enslaved, but not yet free.”52 Gender is a category for Humans. The violence of ungendering is a domain for the captive, those who died in the hold of the ship and continue dying by the wayside of gender.

#### Their theory of gender is parasitic on black captivity and forced violation, all of their attempts to describe violence through the framework of “feminity” and “masculinity” is complicit in the hypersexualization of blackness

Douglass 16 (Patrice Douglass, PhD candidate in the Culture and Theory Program at UC Irvine, 2016, “At the Intersections of Assemblages: Fanon, Capécia, and the Unmaking of the Genre Subject” in *Conceptual Aphasia in Black: Displacing Racial Formation*, pp 121-124, modified) gz

The lingering traces of blackness apparent in *Terrorist Assemblages* (2007) explicitly emerge here. What is at play in this calculation is a grotesque misalignment of power. It is grotesque in the sense that it participates in disfiguring the structure of blackness. As descriptive theories labor to apprehend the constitutive relationship between black gender and violence, the response identifies the description as the cause. Black feminists are thus accused of producing a condition so confining it infringes on the radical freedoms of others, rather than seeing this condition as that which black gender is confined to. The theory Puar is producing stabilizes itself through the assumption that blackness is, as it appears, objective and thus already always dealt with, manageable, and disposable. This performance of accusation by way of assertion brings to the forefront anxious disregard of black specific theorizing, by identifying it as forceful and oppressive thinking that clouds the theoretical possibility of other marginalized subjects and upholds the already privileged white and black paradigm. As Jared Sexton argues, it comes to be asserted without inquest that “blacks have *inverted* racial hierarchy—or *reversed* racism—to the categorical disadvantage” (Sexton 2008, 36), of other racial groups. No emphasis is placed on why black feminist theory centers attention on racial *and* sexual difference, and again fault is attributed to black feminism for holding firm to something that assumedly no longer structurally exists in a distinct and substantive manner. Yet and still, there is no counterevidence provided to show how black women are constituted otherwise.

The shortsighted nature of this position is that to make a critical departure, the anchoring claim situates itself against something that is structurally destabilized and silenced in arguing, without concerted force, its opposition. Theory cannot be post-blackness without blackness, as there is an essential quality to blackness that allows for such claims to register as possibilities. Without explication Puar succeeds in developing a new theory of queer liberation by employing blackness in its overdetermination, all without illustrating how and if blackness and queerness are distinctive political organizations. As Sharon Holland argues in *The Erotic Life of Racism*, “The erotics of the old black/white binary we understand not only racism but potentially our erotic selves” (2012, 14). While Puar might like to assert the application of queerness to the terrorist assemblage, she rejects the understanding that queer is constitutive with sex; as an analytic tool it cannot be disarticulated from its historical emergence as a term that has been used to mark non-heteronormative sexual and non-sexual behaviors vis-à-vis Cohen. Thus the forceful nature in which blackness is evacuated for queer modalities misrecognizes that black and queer genealogies have an inexplicable history. Puar is upholding this claim through an assumption that a connection must be forged where one is not already, and also, that queerness offers blackness a quality that the reverse pairing does not offer.

The push by Puar to force blackness to come to terms with queerness is a political misnomer. Viewing these categories as distinctive associations does not take into consideration what has been done with non-heteronormalized black sex “before” and prescribes correctives under the auspices of radical political change that employ technologies of classification that are genealogically rooted in black suffering. When gender and sexuality are not theorized through blackness, their constitution is assumed as not inherent of being and thus discourse functions to dislodge the subject from the perception of essential structuring, by arguing that they are in fact mutable. However, blackness reveals that the freedom, will, and ability to find possibility in gender and sexuality are produced only through beings that exist in contradistinction to blackness. Gratuitous violence ~~cripples~~ [wrecks] the ability of truth to emerge through black distinction, making it structurally unclear just how the black suffers.

Hortense Spillers (1987) offers a precise and critical theorization of how the sexual violations borne onto the black female body under the domination of slavery produce a deadening political silence around their occurrences. Spillers locates this economy within “an American grammar book” that demarcates a violating relation to the black gendered body, that through the application of its grammar functions as a logic that does not speak or reveal its maneuvers or motivations. A condition so totalizing that the evidence to prove its existence as complete domination and the “counter-evidence,” its chartable acts of resistance are without proof that allow them to be imagined as a systematized occurrence. The log-books kept by slave ship captains and crew members along the voyages of the middle passage render for Spillers that “the sexual violation of the captive females and their own express rage against their oppressors did not constitute events that captains and their crews rushed to record in letters to their sponsoring companies, or sons on board in letters home to their New England mama” (Spillers 1987, 73). Acts of sexual aggression and domination in this respect located themselves within an economy of silence, from which actions of intent and responses to pain were made undetectable. What happened to the body, in materiality and theory, as a result of this economy of violence—that produced racial slavery as a global system and race a trans-global apparatus of power and domination—forced dispersals of injury into spaces, temporalities, and realms in manners that persist in maintaining the silence of how the unbridled access of the black female body as raw material acts as the condition of possibility for a host of other racially gendered and sexualized violences to unfold.

As illustrated through a reinvigoration of the work of psychoanalytic theorist David Marriott, Zakiyyah Jackson (2011) argues that the discursive functioning of gender and sexuality hold out a peculiar relationship with blackness one established through the formulations of blackness as an ontological category and not as an identity, predicated on political choice as Puar argues. Jackson critically argues, “The violence that produces blackness necessitates that from the existential vantage point of black lived experience, gender and sexuality lose their coherence as normative categories” (Jackson 2011, 359). This point speaks directly to Puar’s inability to account for black feminist protocols in the terrorist assemblage. Black feminism as a political project deforms genre; it is in essence the unmaking of genre subjectivities. For Puar queerness is a choice association tethered to gender and sex or not; however, what Jackson reveals is that such choice of association is not granted to blackness, or the black lived experience, as a choice of association or disassociation. Jackson goes on to point to blackness as the “absolute index of otherness” where subjectivity is concerned and states, “While particular nonblack sexual and gendered practices may be queered, blackness serves as an essential template of gendered and sexual ‘deviance’ that is limited to the negation not of a particular practice but of a state of being” (Jackson 2011, 359-60). Blackness is always already gendered and sexually situated, and those who assume it as not critically misunderstand the manner in which blackness enters coherence not through race but as a contrapuntal position to existence itself. Thus the insistence by Puar that queer times are post-black times (post-civil rights) miscalculates the fact that blackness queers time; it destabilizes modes of existence assumed as stable, instable, immutable, and mutable. This is not by way of choice but through violence that applies itself to black life in theory and in thought as if blackness requires no further explication or theoretical engagement.

Blackness finds itself cast in politics time and time again as the example from which to draw but from which generative political possibility is assumed to no longer exist. Puar is exemplary of this response to blackness in theory; however, does not represent the totality of this maneuver. Continual and ongoing access to blackness creates the conditions of possibility for new arising political subjectivities to form as they access blackness in objectifying ways to tether and suture critiques. This manifestation is authorized through the specific historical and continued relationship between blackness and (un)gendering violence that functions as an authorizing mode of access, producing structural, material, and theoretical entrances into blackness as the subject which any- and everyone can interject upon without the necessity of proven authorization. Just as Capécia’s protagonists marked themselves as worthy life subjects against the inability of black women to do the same, speaking for them through the register of disdain, the terrorist assemblage is able to take flight by staging a critique against a seemingly defenseless blackness, that in its presentation is assumed as devoid of a history and condition of suffering all its own. This arrangement is the afterlife of capture and sexual violence as a paradigmatic arrangement; that is to say it is the afterlife of slavery. This is Miss Moore’s lesson.

#### The Affirmative is an example of cruel optimism – Believing that something can or will get better is a trick of time that allows for even more violence because we believe that things will get better, just not now.

Warren 15 (Calvin L Warren is Assistant Professor of American Studies at George Washington University: Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope, *CR: The New Centenial Review*, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring 2015, published by Michigan State University Press, p. 220-223)//

This brilliant analysis compels us to rethink political rationality and the value in “means”—as a structuring agent by itself. What I would like to think through, however, is the distinction between “hope” and “despair” and “expectations” and “object.” Whereas Farred understands political participation as an act without a political object, or recognizable outcome—without an “end,” if we think of “end” and “object” as synonyms—I would suggest that the Politics of Hope reconfigures despair and expectation so that black political action pursues an impossible object. We can describe this contradictory object as the lure of metaphysical political activity: every act brings one closer to a “not-yet-social order.” What one achieves, then, and expects is “closer.” The political object that black participation encircles endlessly, like the Lacanian drive and its object, is the idea of linear proximity—we can call this “progress,” “betterment,” or “more perfect.” This idea of achieving the impossible allows one to disregard the historicity of anti-blackness and its continued legacy and conceive of political engagement as bringing one incrementally closer to that which does not exist—one’s impossible object. In this way, the Politics of hope recasts despair as possibility, struggle as triumph, and lack as propinquity. This impossible object is not tethered to real history, so it is unassailable and irrefutable because it is the object of political fantasy.

The politics of hope, then, constitutes what Lauren Berlant would call “cruel optimism” for blacks (Berlant 2011). It bundles certain promises about redress, equality, freedom, justice, and progress into a political object that always lies beyond reach. The objective of the Political is to keep blacks in a relation to this political object—in an unending pursuit of it. This pursuit, however, is detrimental because it strengthens the very anti-black system that would pulverize black being. The pursuit of the object certainly has an “irrational” aspect to it, as Farred details, but it is not mere means without expectation; instead, it is a means that undermines the attainment of the impossible object desired. In other words, the pursuit marks a cruel attachment to the means of subjugation and the continued widening of the gap between historical reality and fantastical ideal.

Black nihilism is a “demythifying” practice, in the Nietzschean vein, that uncovers the subjugating strategies of political hope and de-idealizes its fantastical object. Once we denude political hope of its axiological and ethical veneer, we see that it operates through certain strategies: 1) positing itself as the only alternative to the problem of anti-blackness, 2) shielding this alternative from rigorous historical/philosophical critique by placing it in an unknown future, 3) delimiting the field of action to include only activity recognized and legitimated by the Political, and 4) demonizing critiques or different philosophical perspectives.

The politics of hope masks a particular cruelty under the auspices of “happiness” and “life.” It terrifies with the dread of “no alternative.” “Life” itself needs the security of the alternative, and, through this logic, life becomes untenable without it. Political hope promises to provide this alternative—a discursive and political organization beyond extant structures of violence and destruction. The construction of the binary “alternative/no-alternative” ensures the hegemony and dominance of political hope within the ontoexistential horizon. The terror of the “no alternative”—the ultimate space of decay, suffering, and death—depends on two additional binaries: “problem/ solution” and “action/inaction.” According to this politics, all problems have solutions, and hope provides the accessibility and realization of these solutions. The solution establishes itself as the elimination of “the problem”; the solution, in fact, transcends the problem and realizes Hegel’s aufheben in its constant attempt to sublate the dirtiness of the “problem” with the pristine being of the solution. No problem is outside the reach of hope’s solution— every problem is connected to the kernel of its own eradication. The politics of hope must actively refuse the possibility that the “solution” is, in fact, another problem in disguised form; the idea of a “solution” is nothing more than the repetition and disavowal of the problem itself.

The solution relies on what we might call the “trick of time” to fortify itself from the deconstruction of its binary. Because the temporality of hope is a time “not-yet-realized,” a future tense unmoored from present-tense justifications and pragmatist evidence, the politics of hope cleverly shields its “solutions” from critiques of impossibility or repetition. Each insistence that these solutions stand up against the lessons of history or the rigors of analysis is met with the rationale that these solutions are not subject to history or analysis because they do not reside within the horizon of the “past” or “present.” Put differently, we can never ascertain the efficacy of the proposed solutions because they escape the temporality of the moment, always retreating to a “not-yet” and “could-be” temporality. This “trick” of time offers a promise of possibility that can only be realized in an indefinite future, and this promise is a bond of uncertainty that can never be redeemed, only imagined. In this sense, the politics of hope is an instance of the psychoanalytic notion of desire: its sole purpose is to reproduce its very condition of possibility, never to satiate or bring fulfillment. This politics secures its hegemony through time by claiming the future as its unassailable property and excluding (and devaluing) any other conception of time that challenges this temporal ordering. The politics of hope, then, depends on the incessant (re)production and proliferation of problems to justify its existence. Solutions cannot really exist within the politics of hope, just the illusion of a different order in a future tense.

The “trick” of time and political solution converge on the site of “action.” In critiquing the politics of hope, one encounters the rejoinder of the dangers of inaction. “But we can’t just do nothing! We have to do something.” The field of permissible action is delimited and an unrelenting binary between action/inaction silences critical engagement with political hope. These exclusionary operations rigorously reinforce the binary between action and inaction and discredit certain forms of engagement, critique, and protest. Legitimate action takes place in the political—the political not only claims futurity but also action as its property. To “do something” means that this doing must translate into recognizable political activity; “something” is a stand-in for the word “politics”—one must “do politics” to address any problem. A refusal to “do politics” is equivalent to “doing nothing”—this nothingness is constructed as the antithesis of life, possibility, time, ethics, and morality (a “zero-state” as Julia Kristeva [1982] might call it). Black nihilism rejects this “trick of time” and the lure of emancipatory solutions. To refuse to “do politics” and to reject the fantastical object of politics is the only “hope” for blackness in an antiblack world

#### The Alternative is an act of laceration and redaction that recognizes the innate fissures that exist within the black identity. Only a starting point of flesh can we acknowledge the short comings of other forms of scholarship and suffering.

**Warren 16 – (**Calvin, Assistant Professor of American Studies @George Washington University, “Liquid Blackness: Black Ontology and the Love for Blackness”, Volume 3, Issue 6, PG 37-45, December 2016, Accessed 10/8/17//*SHAUNAK***)**

II. Lacerations and Hieroglyphics We can consider the metaphysical "injury" a laceration and a hieroglyph. What is "stripped" or ruptured leaves a mark—a sign of destruction that is itself a "witness" of the violation. As witness, the sign itself bears a tragic testimony, a recounting of the violence. But what is the sign communicating? The sign, the laceration, becomes a hieroglyph open to a cultural reading and hermeneutical practice. While what it says is not easily interpreted, it can be felt or registered on a different plane of existence. We rely on the affective dimension to translate the ineffable, or more precisely, to provide form for an experience anti-blackness places **outside ethics and the "customary lexis of life and culture**," as Hortense Spillers would describe it.' Feelings provide a necessary vessel for containing unbearable suffering and a vehicle for communicating this experience when traditional avenues of communication are absent. Put differently, affect is a communicative structure, a testimony, for articulating suffering without end. The affective dimension is just as expansive as it is deep, so expressivity is boundless within this dimension. Affect is an invaluable resource for those enduring a metaphysical holocaust; it is the premier form of expressivity. Spillers presents metaphysical violence as a "laceration or wounding." The undecipherable signs produced: ...render a kind of hieroglyphic of the flesh whose severe disjunctures come to be hidden to the cultural seeing by skin color. We might ask if this phenomenon of marking and branding actually "transfers" from one generation to another, finding its various symbolic substitutions in an efficacy of meanings that repeat the initiating moments?, What is injured, then, is the "flesh"—the "primary narrative... seared divided, ripped-apartness, riveted to the ship's hole, fallen, or "escaped" overboard."5 As a "primary narrative," the flesh is the metaphysical target of violence. The flesh, then, is the structure of black existence, an ontological grounding of sorts, which anti-blackness incessantly targets. It is the flesh that becomes injured, and this injury leaves a "laceration" or hieroglyph attesting to the brutality. Thus, the laceration is not just a corporeal sign; although the body might bear its marks, it is registered elsewhere. But what is of interest here is that the laceration as hieroglyph might actually "transfer from one generation to the next, finding its various symbolic substitutions in an efficacy of meanings that repeat the initiating moment."` The laceration speaks through symbolic substitutions across time, across generations. In other words, the laceration is a constitutive feature of black existence in an anti-black world, and it travels; anti-blackness mobilizes it across time (and space). It is indecipherable because it is paradoxical: it is consistent and substitutional, individual and generational, mobile and intransigent. One cannot capture it exactly as it moves across generations, but the metaphysical harm it indexes is felt deeply. Thus, what the teenager in Baltimore experienced was a transferable laceration, one which is flesh-destroying. The injury is much more than humiliation—rather, it is **an onto-metaphysical destruction**. We might also inquire about the "efficacy of meaning," since the hieroglyph means even though it is indecipherable. Georges Bataille understands laceration as a possibility of communication, which leaves the subject fractured. Communication occurs precisely because the subject is not intact, which allows for something like a flow of communication. He says, your life is not limited to that ungraspable inner streaming [mere inner consciousness], it streams to the outside as well and opens itself incessantly to what flows out or surges toward it."' Bataille suggests the laceration preconditions communication, since the laceration is a rupture, an opening that creates a nexus between inside/outside. self/ other, and individual/community. I introduce Bataille, here, to suggest that what Spillers describes as an undecipherable marking, transferable across generations, is a form of communication—since this marking speaks and means by dissolving the distinctions between individual/ community and inside/outside. The "efficacy of meaning" is found in the generational transfer itself. The metaphysical laceration, furthermore, is an **indecipherable sign that must be communicated**, in order to recover the efficacy of (non)meaning. In other words, we may not know exactly what the hieroglyph "means:\* but the efficacy of meaning does not reside merely in certainty (the certitude of comprehension); instead, meaning's efficacy can be found in the transfer (or communication) of uncertainty. Transferring the undecipherable sign through and as communication (from individual, communities, and generations) provides a space of address. Address without redress. It is in the address—as the communicative flow of lacerative signs—that we are able to endure metaphysical violence. Even though we cannot eradicate metaphysical violence, since it is a constitutive component of an anti-black world, we can use the laceration as a vehicle for endurance: black care. Christina **Sharpe introduces the beautiful theory of "wake work," which "is a mode of attending to Black suffering and Black life that exceeds that suffering**." along with her notion of "anagrammatical blackness," which fractures violent epistemic formations. She also conceptualizes wake work as "a problem for thought and care and trying to figure out how we might make operative care, wresting it away from surveillance and the state because the state also wants to imagine care but that care is the foot on your neck."° What, then, would it mean to render care operative? The industry of care is one of antiblack domination—institutions profiting on metaphysical violence and other forms of black injury. But wake work wants to re-imagine care, not as the institutionalization of management strategies, but as a “wake, waiting, a witnessing” of the always already dead thing. The theory of wake work is exceptionally generative and presents care as a “problem for thought,” as Nahum Chandler might call it.9 I want to linger in this problem, the problematic of care for a moment.

### 1NC – Advantage

#### Blackness is unable to access gender because their own blackness is what shapes how gender norms are put upon them. Ziyad 17

[Hari Ziyad, writer for Afropunk, July 12, 2017, “My Gender is Black”, Afropunk, <http://afropunk.com/2017/07/my-gender-is-black/>, JMH]

The truth is, I am not a “normal boy.” I stopped forcing myself into the category of “male” which never seemed to fit me long ago, and though “maleness” is the language that most tongues wrap easiest around when I am seen, it is not the language that makes room for my existence in this world. I used to write about my gender journey all the time––constantly having to re-explain how a person can be non-binary (existing outside of male or female gender identities) without “looking” it, because the way gender “looks,” just like gender itself, is on a spectrum, and the cut-offs we apply are often arbitrary. I thought explaining what was going on in my head might help others make sense of an experience that never made sense for me before. Recently, however, I’ve taken to discussing my gender much less. Conversations about my pronouns have been more annoying than affirming (use whatever pronouns you like). I have found myself with less and less energy to correct being misgendered. No matter how much I explained, the world never seemed to make enough room for my being. **I am only now realizing that this is because Blackness ruptures the laws of gender just like the laws of the state seem intent on rupturing Black life. My gender is Black. That is why my Black partner and I can’t just be “normal boys,” and that is why that child found our queer expression of Black gender such an affront to the playground he had created on the train. Black gender and anyone who embraces its margins were never supposed to exist comfortably in this world in the first place**, a world this boy was taught to try to become part of just like so many of us were––just like I was––even if he is destined always to fail. In the groundbreaking essay “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe”, **Hortense Spillers argues that how gender has been configured for Black people through slavery and its afterlife is outside of “American grammar.”** Calling it “the dehumanizing, ungendering, and defacing project of African persons,” Spillers points out how, historically, *Black gender has not been used to indicate a shared womanhood or manhood with people within white society, but to highlight how Black people are out of step with womanhood and manhood*. Black gender is always gender done wrong, done dysfunctionally, done in a way that is not “normal.” **Even if we didn’t have the language to describe this experience, all Black people have lived through it. This is why Black boys are hyper-criminalized just as Black girls and other Black non-male children are made invisible when talking about the issues of Black children**. But instead of accepting the impossibility of Black gender as reality, and using it to create a different, freer, understandings of Black being, we are pressured to force our way into categories that weren’t just not made for us, but designed specifically for our exclusion. This pressure to salvage something of this anti-Black world rather than reject it fully is part of why we insist on going out of our way to “prove” a manhood and womanhood that was never ours to have in the first place at the expense of trans, non-binary, and queer Black folks alike. Any attempt to fulfill gender roles as outlined outside of Blackness is not only ultimately futile in gaining Black people some sort of access to human treatment, but it also reinforces the violence against Black people who are attempting to build worlds that embrace their nonconformity. In the case of the Black boy on the train, this attempt to normalize boyhood translated to violence against my queer existence. But attempting to normalize a queer existence without reckoning with the specific role of Blackness outside of “American grammar” can reinforce anti-Black violence as well. This is why when Black and white queer people come into conflict, the state’s response of protecting the humanity of the white person is always predictable. To argue that “my gender is Black” is not to ignore our different experiences within Blackness, or to erase the unique struggles of different gender nonconforming individuals. **I am not saying that my experience is the same as a Black woman’s, or a Black trans person’s. I am simply trying to emphasize the importance of recognizing how none of us Black folk can “conform” to manhood and womanhood as those constructs have been formed,** nor can we even “conform” to queer, trans and non-binary genders that way either––the way that makes the state recognize us as human.

#### Legal focus replicates a cycle of cruel optimism and empirical failures that solidify the settler state’s authority and redirect black energy from community-building to courtrooms.

Ramsey 21, J.D.-M.Div. candidate at Harvard Law School and Harvard Divinity School. (James Stevenson, “Lawyering in the Wake: Theorizing the Practice of Law in the Midst of Anti-Black Catastrophe”, 24 *Cuny L. Rev. Footnote Forum* 12, pg. 18-22)

Conversely, wake work is about paradoxically clinging to life amidst death and catastrophe. The game has been lost. There is no pre-slavery Blackness. There is no un-murdering, no un-spilling of blood. There is no available expulsion of a foreign power, as in the case of Gandhi's India, nor is there any reason to foresee or hope for a surrender of our government structures to Indigenous folk, as in Mandela's South Africa; apartheid is perfected here. Outside of worldwide upheaval, the state – this crystallized settler colony – is here to stay, as are the scars on the peoples residing in the underbelly of society, which holds up the rest of it. 30 The hold is sturdy, and those who have been disposable are still disposable; as a matter of policy, the starved in history can still be starved, the historically captured can still be captured (e.g., arrested and incarcerated), and so on. 31 What would it mean for lawyers to practice from this place of containment, from apparent defeat? Not primarily from an obligation to universal ideals or political affiliations as Delmas describes, but from a collective mourning and hunger? How might "politics" and "obligations" be recast in the wake, and how might we triage them? Starting from the first analysis of divided loyalties, how might lawyers thinking from within the wake determine the relative weights of our obligations to the law and to those on the margins? What does the law mean to us who are already always the living dead, those whose deaths make the world possible?32

As scholars and movement lawyers have long explained, a singular focus on legal remedies for the marginalized in our context has several pitfalls and other shortcomings. First, concentrating solely or even primarily on the systemic reform of the legal system and/or direct client services has not worked. To be sure, it is no longer legal, strictly speaking, to segregate schools based on race, 33 but housing and school segregation persist.34 Lynching is technically illegal, but it persists. 35 Police still kill Black people, Black children, legally and illegally. 36 Mass incarceration has been decried by some, 37 and yet prisons, along with a visceral, systemic need to punish, also persist and are levied against Black people in particular, who have always been necessarily capturable.38 Some voting rights for Black people were secured on paper,39 but they have since been both resisted in practice and rolled back formally. 40 Wealth inequality between Black people and white people has ballooned over time, and, even more harrowingly, inequalities in life expectancy between Black people and white people still exist. 41 I do not mean to dismiss the steps toward reducing these inequities that have been made through the law or by legal actors. But, as discussed earlier, these injustices are not accidents or anomalies; they are constitutive parts of the system as it currently exists, and they mean something about who in this country can (still) be hurt and stolen from and about what this country is. Appealing to such a system to change itself has not been proven effective on its own, as many scholars have observed; forms of state oppression merely shift from one form to another.42 These so-called reforms leave the violent core of the nation intact because they must; the underlying, necessary penchant for anti-Blackness and the domination of Indigenous peoples has remained as the lifeblood of the nation-state. 43

Second, along these lines, appealing to the state for relief reinscribes the state, the coercive power it uses to effectuate its ends, and our own status as Black (non)subjects. 44 As Anthony Farley explains, praying to the state for relief is to accept the power of the state to say "yes" but also its power to say "no": "To request equality is to surrender before one begins. To request equality is to grant one's owners the power to grant or deny one's request. To grant one's owners such a power is to surrender oneself to one's owners entirely and completely." 45 To recognize this power is to submit to the law's (necessary) privileging of its interests those that give it coherence and legitimacy: the erasure of Native American peoples and the infliction of perpetual suffering upon Black people as punishable, malleable, detestable flesh 46 -over our own:

To pray for legal redress is to bow before the authority of law .... Law is only the relation of white-over-black to white-over-black to white-over-black. When we follow a legal rule we follow only the track that we have ourselves laid down. In other words, we ourselves are track, we become the track when we lay down, and we follow that track white-over-black into the future that lasts forever.47

Third, as various scholars have observed, focusing on legal redress to the exclusion of other tactics and remedies, which lawyers are prone to do, has the potential to block the building of power in the communities those lawyers serve, creating serious problems in movement work.48 For example, such a focus often contains social action and energy within the domain of the courts, as opposed to building sustainable structures and practices within the community itself." There is a lurking tendency for lawyers, because of our conservative, risk-averse training, to quell radical thought and tactics-in the name of precedent and rationality-and instead bow to the law.5 Because strictly legal approaches often rely on the unique credentials, skill set, and language of lawyers, such approaches can center and empower lawyers in movement strategy, rather than empower activists and members of the community.51 A law-focused approach tempts lawyers and community members alike to conflate the lawyer's role with that of an organizer, which is problematic because lawyers and organizers tend to employ different frameworks and techniques." Our legal system tends to atomize legal disputes and claims, often forcing legal proceedings into person-against-person conflicts and making it difficult for collective legal action, coalition building, and redress of harms on a community level.53

#### The presumption that markets can be about individual choice as a matter of inclusion is an attempt to efface history and rescue race from blackness, located as absent relationality or agency.

Dumas 13 (Michael J., Assistant Professor at the University of California, Berkeley in the Graduate School of Education and the African American Studies Department, “’Waiting for Superman’ to save black people: racial representation and the official antiracism of neoliberal school reform,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 34:4, 2013)

The rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s shifted the relationship between governmentality and race; while in earlier periods, the state positioned itself as the leader in advancing antiracism, under neoliberal multiculturalism , it is neoliberal economic policies and ideological formations that are seen to resolve the problem of racism. The market, in this hegemonic frame, knows neither race nor racism, and is therefore regarded as best suited to facilitate racial equality. Neoliberal multiculturalism promises to usher in the post-racial period, by nurturing a new global citizenship centered around economic participation. ‘ In short ’ , Melamed contends, ‘neoliberal multiculturalism has portrayed an ethic of multiculturalism to be the spirit of neoliberalism ’ (p. 42). In doing so, neoliberal multiculturalism abandons any explicit mention of race. While liberal multiculturalism employed discourses of equity, diversity and freedom, ‘ now open societies and economic freedoms ... and consumerist diversity signify multicultural rights for individuals and for corporations ’ (p. 43; italics in original). Neoliberal multiculturalism is still attentive to racial difference and recognizes inequitable outcomes, but explains these differences as essentially not about race or (in) justice, but individual and group choices. As Melamed explains: Neoliberal-multicultural racialization has made this disparity appear fair by ascribing racialized privilege to neoliberalism ’ s beneficiaries and racialized stigma to its dispossessed. In particular, it has valued its beneficiaries as multicultural, reasonable, law-abiding, and good global citizens and devalued the dispossessed as monocultural, backward, weak, and irrational – unfit for global citizenship because they lack the proper neoliberal subjectivity. ( 2009 , p. 44) In contrast to black stigmatization under liberal multiculturalism, here the focus is on the distance between black subjects and the market. Through the neoliberal-multicultural lens, we can still feel sympathy to the extent that these subjects are perceived as being prevented from participating in the market. However, if they reject opportunities to participate in the market, no matter how rigged that system may be, then our sympathies can be justifiably withheld. Any argument that the economic sphere is already regulated by racial privilege will fall on deaf ears, as the market is already presumed to be multicultural and racially ethical (i.e. post -racial) on its face. I want to suggest that, even in a neoliberal-multicultural period, we can still identify elements of racial liberalism and liberal multiculturalism. History is never erased or transcended; dimensions of the previous periods are evident in our national-racial imagination and in the racial representations that inform and are informed by that imagination. Waiting for Superman as a cultural and political product Near the beginning of Waiting for Superman (Guggenheim, 2010 ), Harlem Children ’ s Zone founder and so-called education ‘ reformer ’ , Geoffrey Canada, recalls his childhood disappointment in learning that Superman is not real. ‘ Even in the depth of the ghetto ’ ,he explains to the off-camera interviewer, ‘ you thought, he ’ s coming. I just don ’ t know when, because he always shows up and he saves all the good people ’ . As he speaks, images of a young Canada fade to black, interspersed with images of George Reeves as the hero in tights in the 1950s TV series, Adventures of Superman : I asked my mom, do you think Superman is – she said, Superman is not real ... and I said, what do you mean, he ’ s not real? And she thought I was crying because it ’ s like, Santa Claus is not real, and I was crying because there was no one coming with enough power to save us. In inspiring the title of the controversial documentary, Canada presents an image of a poor urban black community without a sense of hope, innocent but helpless in the face of social, economic and spatial marginalization. A people in need of a savior, the young black boy reckons, would do well to appeal for help to the ultimate all-American (white) superhero. Here, his city neighborhood becomes constructed as an uninhabitable jungle (Leonardo & Hunter, 2007 ). Unlike in some rightist interpretations, the black residents of Canada ’ s ghetto are not to blame for their condition, but instead are victims of something unnamed, a tragic historical accident. Blameless, they earn our sympathies; however, they clearly do not have enough agencies to help themselves. Or as Canada suggests, poor African Americans are so far gone, their salvation may require someone with superhuman powers. The producers of Waiting for Superman use Canada ’ s childhood memory to frame the film ’ s heartbreaking, liberal racial narrative, in which racial inequities are bemoaned without any acknowledgment of racism, (good) people of color eschew collectivist racial politics, and black subjects in particular are quick to point out their own personal moral and emotional failures as the cause of their own low educational aspirations and attainment. Waiting for Superman is significant as a cultural and political product, because it has been largely embraced by corporate education reformers like wealthy philanthropists Bill Gates and Eli Broad, and because of its harsh critique of teacher unions and uncritical praise for private educational-entrepreneurial ventures like KIPP and Teach for America. Although the film generated a massive critical response from academics and progressive education advocates (see, for example, http://www.notwaitingforsuperman.org ), it enjoyed a generally sympathetic and often enthusiastic response everywhere else, from glowing newspaper and magazine stories, to favorable coverage by influential media personalities like Oprah Winfrey and Katie Couric. Waiting for Superman is also important, because it is perhaps the most influential popular-discursive effort to advance a new managerialism in education reform. Manage- rialism, as Michael Apple ( 2006 ) explains is led by an emerging group of middle-class professionals committed to using business models of profit, competition and efficiency to ‘ reform ’ education (and other public institutions and functions). This entails privatizing some schools, and financially and politically undermining remaining public institutions, which are then forced to compete with these marketized schools. Ultimately, then, the argument can be made that private entities can more effectively deliver services that have previously been understood as public, as part of our collective responsibility for the public good. Managerialism is ‘ an ideal project ’ , Apple contends, ‘ merging the language of empowerment, rational choice, efficient organization, and new roles for managers all at the same time ’ (p. 25). Waiting for Superman is, in effect, a managerialist manifesto for education in the United States. What we learn in examining racial representations in the film is exactly how mangerialism aims to win for the rightist project a certain innocence vis à vis racism, and more, a sense that racial progress depends on adopting conservative ideology and reform policies. The story arc of Waiting for Superman , its primary suspense, centers on a competitive public lottery system in which children and their families vie for a severely limited number of student spots in highly-regarded charter schools. It is The Hunger Games in reverse; here, those not selected are presumed to be the unfortunate ones, condemned to suffering and abuse, while the masses watch. And like that blockbuster motion picture, Waiting for Superman is a cultural product, not simply a documentation of truth, or policy, or everyday life. The filmmakers construct a dramatic plot, with messages embedded in the images and also made explicit in the text. We meet the families, hear them share their struggles and dreams, and explain what they believe accounts for their own educational and/or social marginality. The filmmakers intend to evoke enough sympathy that as the film comes to its dramatic final scenes, we are emotionally invested in the outcome, anxious to discover if the students will be offered admission, as the number of still available seats becomes smaller and smaller. In most cases, the families experience crushing disappointment, which allows opportunities for wrenching close-ups of terrified eyes, tear-stained cheeks, and hands still clenching strips of paper with losing numbers. To a great degree, the filmmakers need, perhaps the audience too needs, or at least desires, to see suffering. Not only does it help the filmmakers make their argument about the state of public education, but it is also better theater, more compelling entertainment. Ultimately, our own humanity is affirmed, because we care so much about these strangers on the screen. In one particularly moving scene, we see a Latina mother, Maria, touring a Harlem charter school where she hopes her first-grade son, Francisco, will win a spot, to escape his low-resourced school in the South Bronx. Maria is clearly impressed with the resources of the charter school, and looks longingly at the warm, inviting classrooms. ‘ I don ’ t care if we have to wake up at 5 o ’ clock in the morning in order to get there at 7:45 ’ , she says, almost plaintively. ‘ That ’ s what we will do ’ . But, as the New York Times later reported (Otterman, 2010 ), when this scene was filmed, Maria already knew that Francisco would not get to attend this school. The scene was staged after the lottery, in order to ‘ see her reaction to the school, and her genuine emotion ’ , according to director Davis Guggenheim. For him, the scene was ‘ real ’ because the pain and longing in her eyes revealed her excitement about the possibility of having her son attend the charter school, although it might also be argued that they exploited her pain for their own purposes. It is certainly not uncommon for documentary filmmakers to re-enact and re-order scenes; my point here is to underscore that Waiting for Superman is produced , and produced in ways which evoke not only specific emotions, but produce and reproduce certain cultural discourses and ideological formations. As a racial cultural product, the film provides images of racialized bodies and differences that seem natural largely because they draw upon the familiar or the popular, that which we already accept about race, and more specifically here, blackness. As Herman Gray ( 2005 ) explains, ‘ the movement of black images and representation is never free of cultural and social traces of the condition of their production, circulation, and use ’ (p. 21). Hence, what I want to highlight in my analysis of the film is the ways in which black social actors take their (expected) place within the broader ideological conditions of official antiracisms – speaking, gazing and even moving on screen in support of that grander narrative. As I have hinted, if not said explicitly thus far, neoliberal multiculturalism, in conjunction with managerialism, brings an inherent effort to move beyond the black- white racial paradigm. This is more than an acknowledgment of a fuller plane of racial diversity, but an ideological position in which ‘ black ’ is understood as anachronistic, passé and a threat to national progress. Jared Sexton ( 2008 ) is worth quoting at length: Modernizing the nation – at least the segment of the nation with the potential to be ‘ more than black ’ or simply to move ‘ beyond black ’– and liberating it from the deadening weight of the past requires that the signature of its persistence ... be effaced. In this light, multiracialism can be read ... as an element of the ascendant ideology of colorblindness, but it is not thereby identical to it. Its target is not race per se, since multiracialism is still very much a politics of racial identity ... but rather the categorical sprawl of blackness in particular and the insatiable political demand it presents to a nominally postemancipation society. ( 2008 ,p.6) Neoliberal multiculturalism, or what Sexton calls multiracialism, seeks to rescue racial identity from blackness, which is seen as largely responsible for giving race its offensive and oppositional signification. The neoliberal-multicultural cultural product, then, finds effective ways to situate blackness and black bodies as absent of rationality or agency, and black racial politics an ineffective explanation of, or solution to persistent racial inequity. I am not suggesting that there is a direct line between racial representation and racial intent. That is, my aim is not to provide evidence that the film is racist, or that the filmmakers were motivated by racism. Rather, my argument is that the film was produced, and enters a field of already existing cultural productions, in which race and blackness have already been and continue to be imagined discursively, and in which black bodies are situated materially, disproportionately among the poorest and least regarded. What becomes important and potentially destructive about Waiting for Superman is the extent to which its representations reproduce and reify antiblack imaginations, ideologies and sentiments, even as the filmmakers claim to have offered a cultural product – an officially antiracist cultural product – that advocates for poor black people and other marginalized racial groups.

#### Rising up the aff to the level of extinction recreates the existential threat of whiteness

Preston, 17—Cass School of Education and Communities, University of East London (John, “Rethinking Existential Threats and Education,” Competence Based Education and Training (CBET) and the End of Human Learning pp 61-93, dml)

After Marxism, the second existential threat is one of negation and elimination of the subject and here I shall consider conceptions of this from CRT and black existentialism.

Various contemporary educational theories consider the equity and social justice implications of different forms of education with regard to race. The work of Sleeter and Grant (2007) makes the ethical and pragmatic case for multicultural social justice as a key value of education. This has been followed in contemporary work that attempts to consider the various dimensions of social justice. For example, Bhopal and Shain (2014), consider the twin axis of recognition and redistribution as goals of education. Other work examines the role of social distancing from the ‘Other’ by white students as a dynamic process in which Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and working-class students are disadvantaged. In many ways denial of social justice in terms of lack of resources, recognition or access to social space can be considered to be a form of dehumanisation. However, whilst work on social justice and education might consider the lack of humanity in these systems of oppression (applying concepts such as ‘bare life’, Lewis 2006; or ‘othering’ Lebowitz 2016) they do not consider directly existential threats. Threats to humanity on the basis of difference may arise from totalitarianism as much as through war and threats to the environment. The various genocides which have taken place throughout human history have often had a racial, or ethnic, cleansing purpose to them. They have been eugenic threats that are based upon spurious ideas of genetic and moral superiority. Writers on race from Fanon to Du Bois have considered that the threat posed to racial groups may be existential and that there is a short step from psychic, to real extermination. The negation of individuals through economic, social and psychological processes allows for their physical extermination. Du Bois (2014) deals explicitly with existential threat in his short story ‘The Comet’ where humanity is almost wiped out by a threat from space, leaving only a small number of people to carry on. As one of the survivors of the comet is an African American, this leads Du Bois to consider the state of race relations in the USA. The implication of the story is that the existential threat of the comet (which allows the African American character to live in a world entirely free of racial prejudice) allows release from the existential threat of eugenic attitudes. Building on Du Bois, in other work (Preston 2012), I have considered the ways in which preparation for threats, including existential threats such as pandemics and nuclear war, has been in many ways eugenic in that it prioritises the survival of some more than others based upon criteria which include race and ethnicity (Preston 2012). Preparing for disasters and emergencies often prioritises the interests of white people above those of other ethnic minorities. One reason for this is tacit intentionality which means that policymakers and practitioners do not consider human diversity in considering how people may respond to disaster. Policy is often biased as policymakers expect that people will be ‘like me’ which (at least in the UK and USA) means they will often be white, middle-class, educated, English-speaking men. In planning for threats, there will be various ways in which such biases are included. For example, they may not consider publishing advice in a number of languages, the resources necessary to survive a disaster, the mobility of people and the attitudes of emergency responders. This is unwitting prejudice in that by not considering diversity they are actually making it less likely for BAME people to survive, or protect themselves against, the disaster.

Although these biases may lead to a gradient in terms of survival by different groups in a disaster, they do not appear to relate to existential threat. However, existential threat can be interpreted in a different way in perspectives from critical whiteness studies and CRT.

In critical whiteness studies, whiteness is taken to be not a racial identity, but rather a system of power and oppression (Leonardo 2009). Whiteness was created as an identity not simply as a mode of social classification but as a way of exploiting and controlling others. There are obviously periods in history where this was objectively the case. During slavery in the USA, for example, whiteness was used as a means to distinguish between those people who had the right to own property (whites) and those who could not (Africans), Moreover, whiteness was the obverse of property in that only Africans could ‘be’ assets or property. Enslaved Africans were therefore treated as property and did not have access to the basic rights which would constitute humanity in American society (such as access to education, the right to own property, the right to decide who they should have relationships with). There are obviously parallels between this experience and holocaust when Jewish people (and other individuals) were dehumanised by the Nazis and denied access to basic resources. During imperialism there was also a period whereby other races were categorised to be less worthy than white people and this provided the justification for colonial control, exploitation and often extermination.

Advocates of whiteness studies go further than this and consider that whiteness is not merely a past system of oppression, but a continuing system of white supremacy (Leonardo 2009). The economy and society is comprised in such a way that white people will usually benefit, and BAME people will usually not. This is not only an economic and social system but also a psychological system whereby existence as a full human depends upon one’s racial categorisation. This idea has its roots in the work of Fanon (1986) who wrote that black identity was shaped by the white gaze, but also contemporary writers also consider the notion of whiteness as ‘death’, a categorisation that is rooted in past oppression and extermination, whose remnants exist to this day. This perspective on race and existence leads us to consider what is meant by life, and whether we are not currently living to our full potential (as Marxists would also propose) when existential threat is actually amongst us. For Marxists this would be the expansion of the ‘social universe’ of capitalism that flows between and through us, ‘capitalising humanity’. For critical whiteness studies, this existential threat would be one of whiteness and the negation of existence for a racially classified group of people.

In order to make this idea of constant existential threat more tangible (although the term is not used) critical race theorists use what are known as ‘counter-stories’ to consider how racial dynamics might develop in the future, or to highlight inequalities in the present (Delgado 1996). Derrick Bell (1992) who is considered to be the founder of CRT, uses a much cited counter-story ‘The Space Traders’ to consider the ways in which black people’s lives are classed as being not equal to those of whites in the USA. In ‘The Space Traders’ a race of aliens offer the USA a trade: all of America’s black citizens in return for unlimited, environmentally friendly, energy and technology. After some debate, the American people vote on the proposal and decide to give up all of America’s black citizens to the space traders in return for the futuristic technical goods. Of course, Bell is proposing an analogy between slavery in the past and the present situation of black people in the USA, and perhaps even suggesting that such a thing might happen again. On another level, though, there is also the idea that the existence of black people in America is categorised at a different level of metaphysical worth to that of white people. That life could be traded so cheaply, even plausibly (in the thought experiment) makes us pause for thought in terms of how we classify existential threat.

Although the relationship between CRT and black existentialism may not always seem obvious we can see that there is a nihilistic streak in the work of Bell (1992) with regard to the prospects for survival. In addition, the drawing on the work of Fanon by authors who use CRT as part of their work which shows the perpetual violence encountered by people of colour in education as well as the enduring influence of Du Bois on CRT (Delgado and Stefancic 2001) shows the close connection between the two theories. What links CRT and black existentialism is a basic concern with existence and the meaning of human life under constant threat that can be thought to underpin any concern with social justice. From CRT and black existentialism, we therefore see that existential threat is one of negation through economic, social and political systems and there are degrees of graduation between these forms of existential threats and actual genocide or extermination. The links between these points and CBET might be considered as obtuse but, as we shall see in the next chapter, systems of education can play a role in forms of negation. Obviously, there are social justice implications in the way in which people are treated in terms of race and ethnicity in education. The ‘triaging’ by race and ethnicity of access to education courses, the ways in which certain groups are rationed access to educational routes and the fragility of links between education and the labour market for BAME groups are all part of marginalisation, in which vocational education plays a large part. As part of this process, and probably not coincidentally, these groups are also more likely to find themselves in vocational, CBET courses. However, social justice is not the whole story, and there is a more profound form of equality associated with the right to existence. It is this that CBET threatens through the reduction of the subject to a digital organism as I will show in the next chapter.

## Block

### Kritik

#### The role of the judge is to abolish the white community as a mode of surrendering your life to black life.

**Moten 13** PhD, professor at UC Riverside, researcher and philosopher on black studies, literary theory, poetic studies, and performance studies, (Fred Moten, http://www.minorcompositions.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/undercommons-web.pdf)

The mission then for the denizens of the undercommons is to recognize that **when you seek to make things better, you are not just doing it for the Other, you must also** **be doing it for yourself.** **While** **men may think they are being “sensitive” by turning to feminism, while white people may think they are being right on by opposing racism, no one will** really **be able to embrace the mission of tearing** “this **shit down” until they realize that the structures they oppose are** not only bad for some of us, they are **bad for all of us.** Gender hierarchies are bad for men as well as women and they are really bad for the rest of us. Racial hierarchies are not rational and ordered, they are chaotic and nonsensical and must be opposed by precisely all those who bene t in any way from them. Or, as Moten puts it: “ **e coalition emerges out of your recognition that it’s fucked up for you, in the same way that we’ve already recognized that it’s fucked up for us. I don’t need your help. I just need you to recognize that this shit is killing you, too, however much more softly, you stupid motherfucker, you know?”**

#### Look to their Stratton card- they make gender violence a question of proving one’s humanity which presupposes a neutral site for humanism.

Stratton 89 (How to Form a Men Against Rape Group Jack Straton, Manhattan, Kansas May 27, 1989, <http://www.europrofem.org/contri/2_04_en/en-viol/29en_vio.htm>,

It is time to shred the myth that rape will be with us forever, that the best we can do is to teach women to protect themselves with outdoor lighting, locks, or martial arts. This attitude is an abdication of responsibility from those able to respond and an acceptance of rape by those who profess to abhor rape. I declare to you that there is no acceptable level of death, no acceptable level of humiliation, and no acceptable level of degradation in a culture that calls itself civilized. How can a country that holds justice high, a country dedicated to freedom, accept the level of fear that women live with daily? We’ve got to stop rape, and we can stop it. For too long we have lived in denial. I can no longer deny the reality that every rape is a violation of my humanity. I can no longer deny that my silence implies my consent. I can no longer deny my sisters their freedom. What man can look his daughter in the eye and try to explain that "we live in the land of the free, but you must not go out at night?" Which of you can look your kid sister in the eye and tell her you love her and yet do nothing while she and one in three of her girl friends will be raped by the age of eighteen; raped by their relatives and peers? How long are men going to allow our 96 year old grandmothers and 3 month old daughters to be sexually assaulted, before we get off our butts and do something? I am sick to death of hearing men say that because they would never rape, rape is not their problem. Well who’s problem is it then? Obviously women who survive an assault experience a "problem" — a "problem" that will transform their lives for years to come. But what about the father who is ready to kill because his daughter has been raped? Is he experiencing "a problem?" And why doesn’t he generalize his feelings about his daughter to every woman on the planet? What about the husband of a woman who has been raped whose marriage dissolves within 2 years in 2 of 3 cases? Is he experiencing a problem? What about the college senior whose partner lives with fear of rape or memories of rape? Is he experiencing "a problem?" What do men say? "Oh I’m sympathetic, but I really don’t have the time right now." Rest assured that unless you make the time right now, your problem of rape will be waiting for you when you finally get around to doing something. "I’ve got to put my energies into stopping nuclear war" or "environmental destruction." When will you make the connection that the same male patterns of violence involved in power, control, and humiliation in international conflict are involved in the violation, degradation, and domination of individual women by individual men? You identify with the porpoises that are destroyed at the hands of the tuna industry to provide a food source for you to eat. Why is it harder for you to identify with the women who are humiliated, mutilated, and murdered at the hands of the pornography industry to provide images for you to view while masturbating? How can a new age man consider himself sensitive if he cannot sense or does not respond to the pain that engulfs his sisters? "But what can I do?" Consider that: A 1987 survey of 6,159 students on 32 college campuses by Sociologist Mary Koss found that: • One in four women had experience a rape or attempted by the age of twenty-five. • Eighty-nine per cent of the rapists were known by their targets — men in our own peer groups. • One in thirteen men admitted forcing women to have sex, but virtually none of these men considered themselves rapists. These men, in other words, considered themselves normal, and thought that their sexual behavior was excusable, expected, and even acceptable. Sociologist Diana Russell found that 9.3 percent of female children under 16 years of age have experienced a rape or attempted, with 95 percent of the perpetrators being male (and 38 percent members of the nuclear family). Sociologist Judith Siegel, has found that at about half as many male children are sexually assaulted as females, with 93 percent of all perpetrators being male. Clearly our male peers need to be educated out of their rape behavior. And who is better to take on this task than you and I? Meaningful social change to end rape depends on action and education — men talking with men about rape and about sexism in general. Men Against Rape is in the process of forming, and this is an invitation to men in this community, and any women who would like to work within this context, to join us in working to stop rape. Our first meeting will be . (For information you may contact me at .) Having outlined the harshest reasons why each of us should consider becoming personally involved in working to create a rape-free society, let me end on a warmer note. Working with a group of evolving men, in association with activist women, on such a positive goal is a very valuable, fulfilling experience. Personal stories about our own socialization are one of the most effective means to help both men and women understand and eliminate the roots of rape and rape-like behavior in men. And consideration of our experiences also helps us in our own transformations. It is our hope to have the membership of the group be as diverse as possible so that we may learn from the experience of others, particularly personal experiences of racism and other oppressions that are so closely connected to the oppression of women.

#### Their feminist kritik of Afropessimism fails to understand its nuisances- Afropessimism seeks to understand how white women and men both contribute to the rape of black women and men. Rape is not just an act but also a paradigm that is used to displace black people without recourse.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 166-169, JMH]

I arrived in Copenhagen steadfast in my conviction that even the most persecuted White women are a priori positioned as masters, in relation to Black people, even to Black men. This assertion gains greater clarity when we consider that at the level of consciousness, what psychoanalysis calls preconscious interests, the realm of the psyche that can be brought to consciousness—and spoken—it would appear as though Nancy Jane Smith, Charles Robbins, and the unnamed Black woman in the desert are all of the same species. They are all Marxist revolutionaries who would argue that they are of the same species: the working class. But what becomes clear as one compares their interrogations is that though they share the same consciousness, and though they would say they are of the same species (working-class Humans), in point of fact the unconscious realm of the psyche has no capacity to recognize Charles Robbins and the unnamed Black woman in the desert as Human beings. They cannot be incorporated into filial or affilial imaginaries of family or political relations, regardless of the preconscious/conscious mind’s protestations to the contrary. In short, the conscious mind of a radical says, “I don’t see color,” whereas the unconscious mind is “saying” (in ways that are rarely legible) “I live in fear of a Black planet.” **This duality is sustained by the fact that the violence that positions Nancy Jane Smith as a White woman and as a Human being is structurally different than the violence that positions Charles Robbins and the unnamed Black woman in the desert as Blacks and Slaves.** This flies in the face of theoretical and political assumptions that non-Black intellectuals and activists hold dear about violence and gender. The challenge this argument presents is not intellectual, but rather it is emotional; especially when it comes from a cisgender Black man who critiques the paradigm of White femininity in less than dulcet tones. **But White women, as Human beings, are structurally more powerful than Black people, because they, White women, are members of the Human species, whereas Blacks are the sentient beings against which Humanity is defined.** Even in the horrible act of rape (of White woman by a Black man, for example) the structure of the relation does not change. This is an incendiary assertion. But no theory worth its salt should shy away from pyrotechnics**. To begin with, Afropessimism in no way condones or seeks to explain away sexual violence. On the contrary, violence, as structure or paradigm, and sexual violence, as an ensemble of practices within that paradigm, is at the heart of Afropessimist meditations, albeit in ways that run counter to received wisdom.** In the centuries when slavery was still on the books, and not strangely sublimated by euphemisms like “citizen” and “universal suffrage,” a male slave forcing a female slave owner into sex against her will was as morally wrong as a male slave master forcing a female slave into sex against her will. Sex as a weapon is revolting and cannot be condoned. Despite all the moral injunctions against such acts, to suggest that the male slave’s rape of his female master is also a problem of ethics is to mistake force, the musculature of the Black male rapist, for power, the web of institutional capacities that make him an extension of her prerogative and power, even in the act of rape. **At the level of performance, she is his victim. At the level of paradigm, he is still her tool.** What does one do with that? One does not look for answers that “solve” the problem of performance while ignoring the problem of paradigm. One sits with it. No Marxist revolutionary would say that shorter working hours and higher wages for workers redress the unethical paradigm of capitalism. But when many people encounter the Black, a sentient being who, unlike the worker, does not have a problem but, rather, as Du Bois has written, is a problem, the image burns too intensely for the eyes. But, even at the risk of searing our retinas, we will gaze unflinchingly at this flame. Even though women in the room where the Copenhagen workshop took place were not, for the most part, White women, many of them were not Black women either; and they knew enough from my introduction that the White woman in Peter Watkins’s Punishment Park (a radical, left-wing prisoner named Nancy Jane Smith) was a stand-in for any non-Black woman. I planned to return to this thorny proposition—that the status of non-Black women vis-à-vis Black men hasn’t changed over time—with a quote from an article by Jared Sexton, where he writes: [**It] seems counterintuitive . . . [but] because of her historical implication in the structures of white supremacy** (marked by her limited capacity to marshal state violence or state sanctioned paramilitary violence), **the white woman can have the black man (or black woman) brutalized for transgressions real or imagined.** However, and because of this relation of power, she can also rape him, thereby reversing the polarity of a rape fantasy pervasive in the anti-black world; regardless of his size and strength, his prowess and his pride, he is structurally vulnerable to her. (Contrary to many standard legal definitions, she is able to rape him without his necessarily being physically penetrated against his will. In this sense, the fear of rape and the fear of penetration must be carefully distinguished.) **Perhaps rape is better understood not as an isolated act, but as part of a spectrum of sexual coercion generated within a broader set of social, political, and economic relations regulated** (but not simply controlled) **by the racial state and enabling permutations of enactment.**

#### Their aims to incorporate socially dead bodies within state-centric frameworks but ignores that the state is exactly why they are helpless. The 1AC performs an act of pornotroping from which they derive entertainment from saving those they are responsible for subjugating

Weheliye (Alexander G., professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University) 2014 (Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human, Duke University Press, pg. 90-91 C.A.)

Spillers has referred to the enactment of black suffering for a shocked and titillated audience as “pornotroping”: “This profound intimacy of in- terlocking detail is disrupted, however, by externally imposed meanings and uses: (1) the captive body as the source of an irresistible, destructive sensuality; (2) at the same time—in stunning contradiction—it is reduced to a thing, to being for the captor; (3) in this distance from a subject posi- tion, the captured sexualities provide a physical and biological expression of ‘otherness’; (4) as a category of ‘otherness,’ the captive body translates into a potential for pornotroping and embodies sheer physical powerless- ness that slides into a more general ‘powerlessness’” (“Mama’s Baby,” 206). Spillers directs our seeing to several facets of the body/flesh, human/not- quite-human, sovereign/bare life, and so on pas des deux in her insistence on the simultaneous thingness and sensuality of the slave, which lays bare the extralegal components of this volatile Ding. Pornotroping unconceals the literally bare, naked, and denuded dimensions of bare life, underscor- ing how political domination frequently produces a sexual dimension that cannot be controlled by the forces that (re)produce it. As Daphne Brooks remarks, “born out of diasporic plight and subject to pornotroping,” black flesh has “countenanced a ‘powerful stillness.’”5 The hieroglyphics of the flesh, embodied here by pornotroping, circumnavigate the connubial abyss of subjection and freedom, displaying at once the physical powerlessness of the dysselected slave subject and the untainted power of the selected mas- ter subject. In order to better follow Spillers’s brilliant coarticulation of porno and trope, a brief etymological detour is in order. Originally porno signified “pros- titute” and in the ancient Greek context whence it sprang, the term referred to female slaves that were sold expressly for prostitution. Also a derivation from Greek, trope, according to Hayden White, refers to “turn” and “way” or “manner”; later, by way of Latin, trope is aligned with “figure of speech.” White states the following of the palimpsestic structure of this word: “Tropes are deviations from literal, conventional, or ‘proper’ language use. . . . It is not only a deviation from one possible, proper, meaning, but also a de- viation towards another meaning.”6 In pornotroping, the double rotation White identifies at the heart of the trope figures the remainder of law and violence linguistically, staging the simultaneous sexualization and brutaliza- tion of the (female) slave, yet—and this marks its complexity—it remains unclear whether the turn or deviation is toward violence or sexuality.7 90 Chapter Six Pornotroping, then, names the becoming-flesh of the (black) body and forms a primary component in the processes by which human beings are converted into bare life. In the words of Saidiya Hartman, it marks “the means by which the wanton use of and the violence directed towards the black body come to be identified as its pleasure and dangers—that is, the expectations of slave property are ontologized as the innate capacities and inner feelings of the enslaved, and moreover, the ascription of excess and enjoyment to the African effaces the violence perpetrated against the enslaved.”8 The violence inflicted upon the enslaved body becomes syn- onymous with the projected surplus pleasure that always already moves in excess of the sovereign subject’s jouissance; pleasure (rapture) and vio- lence (bondage) deviate from and toward each other, setting in motion the historical happening of the slave thing: a potential for pornotroping.9 In Christina Sharpe’s words, the black body and flesh “become the bearers (through violence, regulation, transmission, etc.) of the knowledge of cer- tain subjection as well as the placeholders of freedom for those who would claim freedom as their rightful yield.”10 How does the historical question of violent political domination activate a surplus and excess of sexuality that simultaneously sustains and disfigures said brutality? Or what are the sexual dimensions of objectification in slavery and other forms of extreme political and social domination? My argument is not about erotics per se but dwells in the juxtaposition of violence as the antithesis of the human(e) (bondage) and “normal” sexuality (rapture) as the apposite property of this figure.11 Once again, I am bracketing questions of agency and resistance, since they obfuscate—and not in a productive way—the textures of enfleshment, that is, the modes of being which outlive the dusk of the law and the dawn of political violence